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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the emerging politics of labour agency as new manufacturing 
locations are incorporated into existing global production networks, using the example of the 
Ethiopian apparel industry. The Ethiopian state has employed an active space-based industrial 
policy to attract leading apparel manufacturers into a series of new industrial parks in the 
country. At the same time, the global apparel industry has undergone a global restructuring 
process in response to cost and productivity pressures exerted by lead firms. We argue that 
the consequences for workers depend not just on state action and lead firms, but also on 
responses by organised and unorganised labour. We extend existing frameworks which 
combine analyses of global production networks with local labour processes by highlighting 
the variegated forms of labour agency used by Ethiopian workers and the interactions of 
factory-based labour grievances with local political conflicts. To capture these factors and 
their interactions, we combine a quantitative large-N survey of factory workers with in-depth 
qualitative interviews with managers, workers, trade union representatives and government 
officials. We demonstrate how industrial parks emerged as spaces of particularly intense 
contestation between workers, company managers and government officials at both national 
and subnational levels. Many industrial conflicts result from the collision of productivity 
imperatives on part of manufacturing firms tied into demanding, but low value-added, 
segments of global production networks with the expectations of workers with limited or no 
prior experience in industry but are compounded by the contradictory actions of different 
state agencies. (247 words) 




The working conditions of millions of workers engaged in production for markets in high-
income countries depend on the conditions of their inclusion into global production networks. 
Such networks cut across different layers of space generating a variety of interconnections 
which lead to historically and geographically contingent labour outcomes. After sustained 
criticism of global production network (GPN) approaches for giving scant consideration to 
the lived experience of workers (Selwyn 2013), there has been a recent spate of activity to 
incorporate labour agency into the broader GPN framework (Coe 2013, Coe & Jordhus-Lier 
2011). At the same time, an emerging literature is seeking to integrate core concerns of 
labour process theory, in particular issues of compliance with and resistance to management 
strategies at the factory level, with theoretical and empirical insights into GPNs (Taylor et al. 
2015). Understanding labour relations at the factory level requires a combination of different 
levels of analysis, from the macro-political economy of growth and structural change in the 
country, through the sector and global production network level, to the micro-level of capital-
labour encounters in the workplace. We illustrate the dynamics of such encounters and the 
contingent nature of outcomes for workers with an analysis of the emerging export-oriented 
apparel sector in Ethiopia. The country offers a case study into the establishment of a new 
export-oriented apparel sector. In the past ten years Ethiopia has embarked on an ambitious 
industrialisation strategy centred around active industrial policy aiming to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by international textile, garment and leather products producers. The 
industry is concentrated in a series of industrial parks, which are supposed to help streamline 
service provision and attract a new industrial labour force. Building an industrial workforce 
is, however, an uneven, conflictive and slow process (Thompson 1967).  
Despite some similarities with the past (Beckert 2015, Brooks 2019), the development of a 
textile and garment industry in the 21st century happens in a very different market context to 
earlier experiences of industrialisation. Since the phasing out of the multi-fibre agreement the 
apparel sector has also become increasingly concentrated (Gereffi and Fredrick 2010). Large 
institutional buyers in the US and EU, including general retailers, specialised clothing 
retailers and branded manufacturers, are converging on a set of buying practices. Such buyers 
demand low-costs, consistent quality and flexibility in both the short and long term from 
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manufacturers leading them to focus on a smaller number of large-scale suppliers.1 In turn, 
some suppliers are moving from offering just assembly of inputs controlled by lead firms 
(called cut-make-trim, CMT) to own design manufacturing (ODM) as ‘full package’ 
suppliers in what is usually referred as ‘economic upgrading’ (Barrientos et al. 2011). The 
largest suppliers have themselves become transnational corporations capable of offering 
manufacturing-related services such as design, logistics, and inventory management. In 
search of new spaces of low-cost production these firms are moving beyond their production 
bases in Asia. As a result, entry barriers are higher, especially for firms from low-income 
countries, and competition among manufacturers is fierce. Concentration among buyers and 
fierce competition among manufacturers results in highly asymmetrical power relations 
among firms in the value chain, even if some of the large transnational suppliers have been 
able to capture part of such high-value activities (Staritz, 2011). 
There are important implications of these developments for workers. Highly concentrated 
global buyers have been able to reduce the unit prices they pay to their suppliers. As a result 
of the increasing dominance of ‘fast fashion’, suppliers are expected to help lead firms reduce 
the ‘time to market’ by turning orders around faster and faster. These two ‘squeezes’ on 
prices and on supplier capabilities generate pressures which are passed on to workers in the 
form of lower real wages and worsening working conditions, including enforced overtime, 
and job insecurity (Anner 2020).We argue, however, that the consequences for workers 
depend not just on lead firms but also state- and international-level regulations, local political 
conflicts, and responses by organised and unorganised labour. Labour outcomes at factory 
level are the result of multiple combinations of factors at the micro-, meso- and macro-level. 
To capture these factors and their interactions, we combine a quantitative large-N survey of 
factory workers with in-depth qualitative interviews with managers, workers, trade union 
representatives and government officials. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on labour regimes in GPNs in three ways. First, 
we advance new empirical evidence on labour outcomes and dynamics of resistance in a 
 
1 A similar dynamic of growing lead firms choosing to work with increasingly large suppliers can also be 




country recently entering apparel GPNs. With the partial exception of Bangladesh (see Anner 
2020, Saxena 2019, Kabeer et al. 2020), empirical evidence on labour outcomes and 
dynamics within the GPN literature is still thin, and especially so for ‘late-late comers’ like 
Ethiopia. Second, existing strands of literature linked to GPN approaches tend to focus on 
labour agency through formal organisations such as trade unions (Cumbers et al. 2008), some 
recent contributions in other contexts and sectors notwithstanding. This paper provides 
evidence on a wider range of forms of resistance, and particularly those not mediated by 
formal trade unions, such as wildcat strikes and high turnover, which are important features 
of the Ethiopian context (Hardy and Hauge 2019) and echo the double indeterminacy of 
labour (Smith 2006).2 Third, the labour-focused GPN literature suggests that the spatial shift 
of capital weakens labour resistance as it moves to poorer countries, but may produce new 
waves and spaces of resistance in the new centres of production (Silver 2003), as evidence 
from East Asia, and especially shifts in labour outcomes in China show (Qi and Pringle 
2019). As Cumbers et al (2008: 372) suggest: ’[multinational companies]…ultimately always 
come up against problems of labour agency and resistance within the production process’. 
The Ethiopian case is of particular interest as conflict and resistance arose in the very early 
stages of global capital penetration, albeit with significant variation across firms. This runs 
counter to dominant narratives of plentiful supplies of labour, a supposedly docile labour 
force comprised of rural women with limited employment experience, and the stability that 
industrial jobs offer compared to irregular informal employment. Understanding this 
variation requires taking local political dynamics into account. This paper focuses on these 
early stages of operation for several international suppliers in Ethiopia. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant 
analytical categories and proposes a theoretical framework to analyse labour outcomes and 
relations within distinct labour regimes that are shaped by global, national and local forces. 
This section also briefly lays out how we collected our data. Section 3 provides the necessary 
 
2 By ‘labour indeterminacy’ Smith (2006: 390) means that labour power i.e. ‘what the employer hires and the 
worker exchanges’, is indeterminate, first, because the amount of effort cannot be fixed ex-ante, and is subject to 
work effort bargaining at shop floor level; second, because of labour mobility, i.e. workers’ ability to change 
employers or simply leave the job as a form of resistance.  
5 
 
context to understand the state, capital and labour in the emerging light manufacturing 
industry in Ethiopia. Section 4 contains the primary empirical material on dynamics of labour 
conflict and resistance and their determinants. 
2 Analysing multi-scalar labour regimes: theory and data 
The configuration of labour relations in the emerging light manufacturing sector in Ethiopia 
has undergone rapid transformations that have accelerated further after the arrival of new 
foreign investments linking into global production networks in the apparel sector. To analyse 
these dynamics, we draw on labour process theory, GPN approaches, and labour geography. 
These strands of literature provide the conceptual foundations for an empirical analysis of the 
emerging politics of production and employment in the emerging light manufacturing sector 
in Ethiopia.  
First, drawing on labour geography, our understanding of how global capital is reconfigured 
worldwide is shaped by the notion of the spatial ‘fix’, which lies at the heart of the expansion 
of globally integrated manufacturing production in developing countries, and especially in 
Asia (Harvey 2001).3 A key insight from labour geographers is how labour agency, especially 
through collective action, influences the different manifestations of a ‘spatial fix’ leading to 
different outcomes for millions of workers in different parts of the world that are increasingly 
interconnected through global production networks (Peet 1983, Herod 2012, Cumbers et al. 
2008). 
Second, the GPN framework emerged to analyse processes of value creation and capture, via 
structures and dynamics of power (corporate, collective, etc), by considering the social, 
network and territorial embeddedness of actors, markets and processes. As core analytical 
concepts ‘the notions of value, power, and embeddedness are used to explore the sector-
specific configuration and coordination of global production networks by firm and extra-firm 
actors.’ (Coe and Yeung 2015: 18). An expanded ‘GPN 2.0’ is pushing the field further in 
 
3 In Harvey’s formulation the spatial fix describes a general tendency of capitalism to overcome, or at least 
postpone, crises that result from the internal contradictions of the system itself by means of geographical 
expansion.   
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order to propose different causal mechanisms connecting these core elements and analyse the 
processes of network formation, coordination, and configuration (ibid.). Although it is widely 
recognised that labour remains a significant gap in the empirical GPN literature, in the past 
ten years there have been notable theoretical and empirical contributions on issues such as 
social upgrading (Barrientos et al. 2011, Selwyn 2013), labour agency in producing 
geographies of labour (Herod 2012), workplace micro-dynamics, gender and migration as 
key markers of labour dynamics within GPNs (Baglioni 2018), and the revival of the concept 
of labour regime, which combines some of the above-mentioned aspects (Coe and Yeung 
2019).  
Third, from the global labour studies field we deploy the concept of ‘labour regime’ as a 
heuristic tool to explore how interconnections between factors inside and outside the factory 
help explain observed differences between practices across sectors and workplaces. This 
concept stems from work on the ‘politics of production’ (Burawoy 1985, Lee 1999) which 
connects workplace labour relations with the macro politics of capital–labour relations in a 
national or global context. In particular, ‘labour regimes’ help us frame the interrelations of 
labour market segmentation and workforce mobilisation, conditions of employment and 
labour processes, and forms of enterprise authority and control (Bernstein 2007: 7). Labour 
regimes build on labour process theory in focusing on the appropriation of surplus value by 
capital through the ownership and control of means of production (Thompson 1989). 
Employers and managers are under permanent tension between manufacturing consent and 
creating internal labour markets that provide some stability to their workforce and exercising 
coercion to make sure work effort matches productivity and quality imperatives (Burawoy 
1979, Collinson and Ackroyd 2006). Beyond the workplace, labour regimes incorporate the 
institutions of social reproduction which, taken together, ensure that workers can be 
mobilised, motivated, utilised in production, and reproduced (Taylor and Rioux 2018, Lerche 
et al. 2017). Labour regime analysis is “necessarily multi-scalar”, incorporating the global, 
national, regional, and local (Selwyn 2016). The associated concept of ‘[local] labour control 
regimes’ emphasizes the role of local/national labour institutions and governance and the 
different sources of disciplining labour, whether governments, labour market conditions or 
employers (Jonas 1996, Anner 2015, Pattenden 2016, Smith at al. 2019, Coe 2015). Local 
labour regimes are embedded in both specific local configurations of class struggle and 
capital-state relations and structures, processes and relations intrinsic to particular GPNs.  
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Based on these conceptual insights, we adopt a multi-scalar framework that combines three 
levels of analysis (Figure 1). Variants of such multi-scalar (or nested scalar) approaches have 
been deployed in recent research on local labour regimes, labour standards and competitive 
pressures in global value chains (Smith et al. 2019, Baglioni 2018, Selwyn 2013). We extend 
previous variants by making the framework more ‘localised’ and specific, moving away from 
broad typologies and unpacking the different key actors (capital, labour, the state) according 
to their contingent manifestations. Beginning at the bottom of Figure 1, are the micro-level 
workplace dynamics and ‘raw’ encounters between employers and workers over wages, 
productivity, safety, effort, and labour time. Different corporate cultures, localised labour 
dynamics, and specific firm-level labour processes affect outcomes in many ways.  
Next are the characteristics and dynamics of a particular sector or set of global production 
networks. Sector/GPN features cut across national boundaries and generate specific 
imperatives of labour control and standards, through market structures, competition, and 
global chain rules. For example, GPNs in textile and apparel are characterised by 
manufacturers, especially those located in lower-end tasks, that survive on tight profit 
margins due to the behaviour of lead firms that dominate these GPNs (Anner 2015). A priori, 
we expect labour processes in companies tied into such global production networks to be 
subject to much more detailed managerial interference, and managers to rely on more 
sophisticated – and often harsher – labour control regimes. Textile and apparel GPNs have 
been categorised as ‘low-wage classic’ labour regimes characterised by strong hierarchical 
work relations, low wages with piece-rates, flexible employment, migrant workers, high 
turnover and a strong anti-union animus (Katz 2006, Lüthje et al. 2013). Variations within 
this type of labour regime may be shaped by ‘varieties of capital’ (Lee 2017), particular 
buyer-supplier relations (Amengual et al. 2019), government regulations, and specific firm-
level corporate ethos, factors that pertain to the micro- and macro-levels of this multi-scalar 
framework.  
The final level is the national and subnational political economy. Here we focus particularly 
on the macroeconomic dynamics shaping economic transformations and structural change, 
alongside the macro-level politics of production, and state–society relations which shape 
labour supply dynamics and the arenas of different struggles, whether over the extent of 
commodification, the limits to labour reproduction, or claims over representation. The 
national-level politics of production works horizontally in terms of the national and 
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subnational relations between state, capital, and labour. The institutions that underpin these 
relations, including labour legislation and its enforcement, trade unions, employer 
organisations, and social protection systems, are critical to understanding labour outcomes in 
any given sector across countries (Lee 2017, Anner 2015).  
 
Figure 1 - A multi-scalar labour regime configuration 
 
Source: Schaefer and Oya (2019) 
 
To capture these various scales, we draw on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data 
collected during extended fieldwork in Ethiopia in 2017 and 2018. Our quantitative data 
comes from survey of 531 manufacturing workers across 25 apparel companies in Ethiopia, 
mostly in garment and footwear, 17 of which were foreign-owned. We purposively selected 
companies to target the most successful enterprises in terms of employment creation and 
export performance. Our sample includes leading firms both inside and outside of the new 
industrial parks. Within each company we constructed a stratified random sample of 
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production workers. Following our main survey in 2017 we conducted a follow-up phone 
survey with 120 workers in 2018 to capture developments in employment status and take-
home pay. We also administered a separate firm survey to each sampled enterprise to collect 
firm-level data. In parallel, we conducted 150 in-depth qualitative interviews with managers, 
workers, trade union representatives, government officials, NGO officials, and members of 
international organisations.4 Our sampling and data collection methodology is discussed in 
detail in Schaefer and Oya (2019). 
3 Capital, labour and the state in Ethiopia’s emerging apparel sector 
3.1 Unpacking the state 
The Ethiopian state has played a central role in managing foreign direct investment and the 
subsequent interaction of foreign firms and domestic workers. State officials, aiming to 
generate foreign exchange, create jobs, and drive broader structural transformation, have 
expended considerable effort to attract international companies involved in leading light 
manufacturing global production networks, especially in apparel. The state has adopted a 
space-based strategy of industrial agglomeration by concentrating incoming FDI in a series of 
new industrial parks. Most parks are government-owned and managed, while other parks are 
owned and managed by foreign firms. The most important parks in terms of employment are 
the government-owned Bole Lemi and Hawassa Industrial Parks, operational since 2015 and 
 
4 Throughout this paper we will refer to interview sources with a simple coding system. The first two letters of 
each code indicate the profile of the respondent and the numbers show the order of interviews (e.g. CM01). All 
interviews were conducted between 2017 and 2018. The letter codes have the following interpretations: CM = 
company manager, usually factory GM or deputy managers; GO = government official in different departments 
and agencies, mainly middle-to-high level officials; TU = trade union representative, either at federal level or 
from factory-level basic unions; WI = worker interview, specifically qualitative work/life histories conducted 
with a sub-sample of workers extracted from the initial quantitative survey; Oth = Other such as NGOs, or other 
key informants (e.g. researchers). This system is designed to preserve the anonymity of respondents, as 
promised in our consent form. 
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2016, respectively, and the privately-owned Eastern Industrial Zone (now Eastern Industrial 
Park), which opened in 2012. Smaller government-owned parks opened in Mekelle and 
Adama in 2017 and 2018. In December 2019 total employment in the industrial parks stood 
at around 82,000 (EIC, unpublished). 
To understand the policy developments that impact the politics of production in the country 
we must unpack the Ethiopian state institutions dealing with FDI management, industrial 
development and labour control. As part of an active industrial policy, a network of 
government institutions has taken the lead in managing FDI, industrial parks, and 
coordinating interventions with other government units. The Ethiopian Investment 
Commission (EIC), the state-owned Industrial Parks Development Corporation, the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, and the team advising the prime minister on industrial policy are at the 
apex of this structure, with the EIC acting as the key coordinating hub. Interventions form a 
continuous learning process, leading to differences in physical and institutional design across 
the different ‘generations’ of industrial parks. Units dealing with public infrastructure, 
especially power and transport, have played a significant role in ensuring adequate 
infrastructure needs for new foreign investors. Labour management is, however, much less 
coherent. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), which is charged with 
making the labour market attractive to foreign investors, plays a contradictory role: on the 
one hand officials seek to avoid potential deterrents to the arrival of investors, such the 
enforcement of labour regulations and the promotion of trade unions, but on the other hand 
officials sometimes act to protect workers in cases of disputes. Regional and municipal 
authorities, including the regional Bureaus of Labour and Social Affairs (BOLSAs) play 
important role in labour mobilisation: directly, by supporting recruitment efforts in industrial 
parks and, indirectly, by managing local services and housing around parks. Moreover, sub-
national authorities also have an important role to play in relation to housing, local transport, 
and the movement of people within the different regions. Therefore, although Ethiopia’s 
industrial policy has been remarkably coherent and ambitious by sub-Saharan African 
standards, a major challenge for the industrial policy eco-system is the effective coordination 
across these different levels of government and the potential contradictions that may arise 
between the priorities of these different institutions. This coordination is made more difficult 
by the fragmented nature of the Ethiopian polity, which is characterised by political conflict 
increasingly fought along ethnic lines. 
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3.2 Unpacking capital 
Government industrial policy has largely been successful in attracting new capital from 
abroad. There has been a rapid expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Ethiopia’s 
light manufacturing since 2012. Between 2012 and 2018 FDI stocks into Ethiopia expanded 
from less than 6 billion USD to over 22 billion USD in nominal terms (UNCTADSTAT 
2020) and by 2017 foreign firms had created close to 100,000 jobs (Cheru and Oqubay 2019). 
A significant proportion of these investments originate in Asia, with Chinese investors being 
the largest group (Staritz and Whitfield 2017). There are different ‘varieties’ of private 
industrial capital comprising three broad waves of industrial investors into Ethiopia. The first 
wave included mostly Turkish textile and apparel investors who arrived before 2010 when 
industrial parks were not yet a core part of the government industrialization strategy. Most of 
these investors were aiming for the domestic market, but some of the most prominent Turkish 
firms in textile and garment were export-oriented. The second wave consisted of first-
generation Chinese investments clustered in the EIP and again included many firms 
producing for the domestic market.5 Finally, the most recent wave, which began in 2014, is 
dominated by suppliers integrated into well-known textile and garment GPNs moving to 
government industrial parks, such as Bole Lemi, Mekelle and especially Hawassa. These 
parks currently host only foreign companies. Despite their particularities, these three waves 
are partly connected because some of the first large-scale export oriented firms to settle acted 
as prime movers and thus catalysts of subsequent waves of investors that saw their initial 
success as a sign of investment potential in Ethiopia (Lin and Xu 2019).   
These different waves map, albeit crudely, onto different accumulation strategies and market 
orientations. A key question is whether firms use their investment in Ethiopia to relocate or 
expand their production. Firms coming from Asia, and especially China, appear to be moving 
into Ethiopia to grow rather than relocate their businesses. Such companies maintain, and in 
 
5 According to our informants, a number of firms with initial trading ties with Ethiopia invested to take 
advantage of domestic market opportunities, especially in construction materials, while Huajian, the well-known 
shoemaker acted as a pioneer among Chinese light manufacturing investors who joined the EIP initiative. See 
also Chen (2019). 
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some cases even expand, their operations in other countries. Garment firms producing goods 
of varying sophistication may move the low technology production segments overseas, in this 
case to Ethiopia, whereas those only producing CMT garments or mid-range leather products 
are more likely to engage in relocation. Many of the former firms reported to be ‘testing’ 
Ethiopia and other African locations before committing to any more significant restructuring 
of production away from their core bases. In the case of Turkish investors, the logic of 
relocation seemed to dominate, driven by a combination of production cost considerations, 
instability in Egypt (where they had operations) and financial difficulties (CM01). By 
contrast, Ethiopian-owned apparel firms are distinguished from foreign-owned firms by two 
characteristics. First, while some domestic firms do export their goods, they are more likely 
to focus on the domestic market. The Ethiopian-owned firms that do export are not normally 
part of GPNs organised by leading global brands and are not sited in industrial parks. Second, 
while many foreign firms have only recently set up operation in Ethiopia, domestic firms are 
on average much older. 
Foreign capital with deep immersion in apparel GPNs is subject to structural patterns that 
affect most suppliers in these GPNs with implications for their prevailing labour regimes. 
Anner (2020) provides compelling evidence of how labour conditions in Bangladesh have 
been structurally determined by a double ‘squeeze’: a persistent prize squeeze that leads to 
intense competition and very narrow margins for suppliers; and a sourcing squeeze 
manifested in fluctuations in orders which add to uncertainty and compel manufacturers to 
meet orders by any means. Both lead to pressures to make labour forces more ‘flexible’ and 
tighten mechanisms to manage work effort. At the same time, there is variation in conditions 
across production locations and firms, driven in part by how different GPN lead firms reacted 
to historical accidents like the Rana Plaza disaster. Better alignment between sourcing and 
social sustainability practices, combined with longer-term supply relations can lead to more 
sustained compliance with labour rights (Amengual and Distelhorst 2019; TU02).  
3.3 Unpacking labour 
There are four basic characteristics that are found in the emerging manufacturing workforce: 
most workers are young, female, have migrated internally, and have relatively high levels of 
education for the comparatively low-skilled jobs they fill (see Table 1). In our sample of 534 
manufacturing workers the mean age was 25 years and 75% were women. Disaggregating the 
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data shows by skill group shows segmentation by gender and origin of firm. While most so-
called low-skilled workers are young women, especially in foreign firms, male workers 
dominate in semi-skilled jobs. Workers in Ethiopian firms are significantly older than their 
counterparts in foreign-owned factories.  
The labour force in sampled factories, especially in recently established foreign ones, is 
substantially more educated than the national average. Among so-called low-skilled workers 
52.8% had completed at least year 10 and another 17.4% had additionally completed a 
technical and vocational training (TVET) course. For comparison, at national level, (primary) 
grade-8 completion rate was 54% in 2015/16 and gross enrolment rate in secondary education 
barely reached 30% (Rekiso, 2019). However, workers employed by sampled Ethiopian firms 
are significantly less educated than the employees of foreign firms. 
 















Mean age (years) 22 30 24 37 25 
Female (%) 82 72 50 54 76 
Never married (%) 77 49 73 40 67 
Migrated for current job (%) 82 60 67 45 73 
Education (%)      
None or primary 
incomplete 
12 34 4 5 17 
Primary (year 8) 
completed 
7 17 4 15 10 
Year 10 completed 54 33 35 20 45 
Year 12, TVET or 
university 
27 16 57 60 28 




The other key characteristic is mobility. Persistent un- and underemployment in many parts 
of the country make labour migration a common feature among young jobseekers in Ethiopia, 
both internally and overseas.6 Unsurprisingly, most workers in our sample are internal 
migrants. However, not all workers moved into factory jobs through the same mechanisms. 
Workers in industrial parks were more likely to have migrated than workers outside of parks. 
There are also differences across industrial parks. For example, in the case of Hawassa, 
workers’ mobility was partly induced by a government policy of far-flung catchment areas, 
while in the Eastern Industrial Park most migrants came from surrounding areas. Across the 
whole sample workers, the majority (58%) of workers just got their first factory job, and 46% 
of workers had no formal work experience. Among workers in industrial parks 65% had no 
previous experience in manufacturing and 47% had no work experience outside of the 
household. 
4 The politics of labour relations in a fast-moving scenario 
According to the narrative put forward by the government and foreign investors Ethiopia has 
a large pool of trainable workers in need of stable jobs and – crucially – ready to work for 
‘competitive’ wages (EIC 2017). By implication, Ethiopia can draw upon a vast reserve army 
of labour of the kind found in China in the 1980s and 1990s to support its bid to industrialize 
by attracting apparel suppliers from Asia. Large numbers of eager workers, many from rural 
areas, were expected to flock the gates of industrial parks seeking work. Such an excess 
supply of labour would raise employers’ bargaining power and should limit conflict, at least 
in the early stages of manufacturing growth. As in some Asian settings, managerial 
expectations were further conditioned by racist and sexist discourses concerning the supposed 
docility Ethiopians in general and of young women, the main recruitment target, in particular.  
However, capital-labour relations in Ethiopian’s apparel export sector have proven much 
more fractious than anticipated. Workers in new manufacturing firms, particularly the ones 
supplying the GPNs of global buyers, have used both direct and indirect forms of labour 
 
6 In addition to job seekers, recent violent conflict in some parts of Ethiopia has led to large numbers of 
internally displaced people.  
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resistance. Direct forms of resistance entail a confrontation with the employer and include 
collective mobilisation and work stoppages, especially in the form of wildcat strikes. By 
contrast, indirect forms of resistance avoid collective confrontation with employers. These 
include ‘exit’ strategies, i.e. workers voting with their feet by leaving the factories or not 
being available for recruitment. Alternatively, workers who remain may employ ‘everyday’ 
resistance strategies such as absenteeism, resistance to overtime, and foot dragging, which 
can have a detrimental effect on productivity. 
Our study found that these forms of collective and individual resistance were common, but 
often unanticipated by many foreign managers. Not all firms or parks suffer in equal 
intensity, though. An examination of the drivers and main contextual conditions increasing 
the likelihood of such problems reveals a complex interplay of mismatched expectations 
between workers and employers and the crucial role of local political conflicts. This section 
therefore explores the dynamics and politics of labour relations in relation to three key 
themes. First are the instances of direct labour conflict, in the form of strikes as well as open 
and disguised collective action. Here our focus is the limited role by formal trade unions. 
Second, we look at less open forms of worker resistance, in particular around turnover, i.e. 
workers voting with their feet. Third, we argue that labour relations are not simply shaped by 
GPN dynamics and the import of prevailing labour regimes in light manufacturing. The 
observed patterns of labour conflict cannot be understood with considering the interaction 
with local politics, as political conflict between central and sub-regional political actors 
affects all forms of labour conflict in Ethiopian manufacturing. 
4.1 Conflict in action: strikes and constraints on collective mobilisation 
Despite the scarcity of stable employment opportunities for the vast number of people 
entering the labour market every year, collective resistance by workers is common in 
Ethiopian labour-intensive manufacturing. Coinciding with the rapid growth in 
manufacturing employment since 2015 (Cheru and Oqubay 2019), the incidence of strikes in 
the apparel industry seems to have increased. An ILO-led survey of 43 firms in the Ethiopian 
textile and garment sector reported that 20% of sampled firms had experienced a strike in the 
previous 12 months (ILO 2016a). According to our survey data, 38% of a sample of 531 
workers reported having witnessed a strike in their company in the 12 months prior. Strikes in 
apparel manufacturing coincided with a wave of strikes in other sectors, especially during the 
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period September 2017 to June 2018, which saw the ‘greatest wave of labor unrest in 
Ethiopia since the mid-1970s’ (Admasie 2018: 432). Most of these strikes targeted foreign 
firms in the flower sector, industrial parks, and other light manufacturing firms outside parks. 
During the same time political tensions led to the destruction of a number of foreign-owned 
factories and plantations by protestors. 
Strikes in the apparel sector were especially concentrated in industrial parks, as well as in 
certain politically volatile locations such as the peri-urban rim of Addis Ababa. According to 
our data, at companies located in industrial parks nearly 50% of workers had been in a strike, 
while outside of the parks only 25% of workers had. There is substantial variation across 
industrial parks, with the highest incidence, 65% of workers, reported among workers in Bole 
Lemi and the lowest, 39% of workers, in the Hawassa park (see Figure 2).7 According to 
company managers in the Bole Lemi park, grievances around living costs in Addis Ababa 
and the lack of affordable housing were particularly acute and had driven some firms to 
consider the in-house provision of food, accommodation and other amenities (CM52). After 
2017, however, the frequency of strikes declined in Bole Lemi, with most firms finding ways 
of minimising the strikes (CM52). Meanwhile, strikes increased in the Hawassa park, 
especially when a major strike erupted in March 2019 (IndustryALL 2019).  
 
Source: Own Survey, 2017 
 
 
7 These data reflect the incidence of strikes among sampled workers, but they underestimate the incidence of 
strikes at firm level. According to workers’ reports, all but one of the sampled factories had seen strike action. 
Figure 2- Union presence and strike action by industrial park, 2017 
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Overall, we find that low wages and wage setting systems lie at the heart of conflict in many 
firms, a conclusion that confirms earlier research by the ILO (2016a). However, as with strike 
incidence, we observe a striking difference between factories in industrial parks and those 
outside. While outside of industrial parks 95% of strikes were about wages, inside the parks, 
which host only foreign companies, concerns such as excessive working time, low-quality 
canteen food and ill-treatment of workers by supervisors accounted for between 26% and 
67% of strikes, depending on the park. Food provision and the presence of foreign managers 
and factory floor supervisors was far more common in foreign firms in industrial parks than 
in firms outside the parks, increasing the potential for conflict over a wider range of issues. In 
the case of the Hawassa park, grievances included obstacles to union representation, and 
issues of safety and harassment outside the industrial park, with young women being 
particularly vulnerable (IndustryALL 2019; WI01, Oth01). Wage and non-wage grievances 
are of course linked, as low wages often led to unsafe accommodation and dangerous 
commutes, and therefore fuelled requests for housing near the park (GO28).  
While monthly wages varied substantially across companies, low wages are a common 
complaint by workers and trade unionists, and in interviews both employers and government 
officials frequently conceded that wages levels were too low. Wage levels were reported as 
an issue by workers in all types of companies but were a particular issue in the international 
companies sited in industrial parks. Our longitudinal evidence also shows that wage growth 
inside most of the parks was no faster than outside of parks between 2017 and the end of 
2018, with the exception of Bole Lemi (see Table 2). The significant rise in nominal wages 
(40%) experienced in Bole Lemi may be related to the frequent strikes and a shared 








Table 2 – Development of estimated mean take-home wages by industrial park, 2017-2018 





























Not in park 1,478 30.2 1,790 124.2 21% 64 192 
Bole Lemi 1,197 45.1 1,675 180.6 40% 60 180 
EIZ 1,365 38.1 1,685 175.4 23% 61 181 
Hawassa 1,033 14.0 1241 56.3 20% 45 133 
Note: 2018 USD wages were converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) using the 2017 World Bank’s conversion factor 
for Ethiopian private consumption. 
Source: Own surveys, 2017 and 2018 
 
The level of wages obviously reflect management decisions and calculations of profitability 
in companies that operate within GPNs with thin profit margins. However, interviews with 
both trade unions representatives and company managers suggested that the government also 
played a role by influencing wage-setting systems. At the time of the survey, a few months 
after most factories in the Hawassa park had started operations, wages there were especially 
low. Some of the differences may be explained by higher living costs in and around Addis 
Ababa. However, the firms in the Hawassa park and the Ethiopian government also operated 
a unique ‘cartel’ system that was established to keep starting wages in Hawassa sufficiently 
low for firms to commit. According to this wage setting mechanism, factories inside the park 
agreed on a common base salary but discretion could be used for performance pay, thereby 
allowing for only limited variation in take home wages across factories. In the early stages of 
park operations many workers reported wages that were close to their low base salaries, 
leading to significant differences with respect to other locations. In addition, government park 
managers appear to have contributed to initial wage repression by recommending out-of-date 
base wage standards to newly arrived companies. Low base benchmarks were repeatedly 
reported by managers in Hawassa, where companies assumed acceptable wages levels to be 
substantially lower than in and around Addis Ababa. Government sources suggested that 
officials set low benchmarks in the expectation that additional performance-related pay 
would lead to much higher wages than the recommended base salaries (IO02; GO28). They 
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also argued that firms should pay higher wages if they could afford them and that 
benchmarks for base salaries, such as the national poverty line, were only indicative of a bare 
minimum wage floor. However, the combination of poorly understood benchmarks, limited 
knowledge of context on the part of newly arrived foreign managers, and the government’s 
fear of discouraging investors led to wage setting systems which drove many of the strikes 
and part of the high labour turnover analysed in the section below. In the eyes of some senior 
managers at the park the starter wage level was clearly low, but that reflected extremely low 
levels of workers’ productivity. As one manager put it: ‘there is no point in rewarding work if 
not good enough for the demands of the industry’ (CM35). This manager, like many others, 
expected rapid increases in efficiency and productivity over a three- to five-year period, 
leading to higher wages via performance-based pay and hence a more stable workforce 
(CM41). 
By contrast, low benchmarks supplied by government officials were not an issue in the first 
industrial park, the Eastern Industrial Zone, where the government did not play an active role 
in organising the arrival of companies and managing the park. In this industrial park, operated 
by Chinese companies, average wages for same jobs were significantly higher than in Bole 
Lemi and the Hawassa park (see Table 2).   
Location within an industrial park was not the only source of heterogeneity across firms. 
Independent of location, larger-scale flagship firms, which have a higher public profile and 
greater media visibility, were particularly targeted by strikes. Wages and working conditions 
were not generally worse in these firms. In fact, a particular factory that suffered a number of 
strikes in recent years offered the highest wages in its industrial park (CM27 and own survey 
results). Workers in more visible firms have a greater incentive to strike, as it is reasonable to 
expect that such companies will be keen to avoid reputational damage. In part, this targeting 
of particularly visible and noteworthy firms is likely a reflection of the role of local politics in 
this phenomenon, a point to which we return below. 
While collective action remains common in the contemporary Ethiopian light manufacturing 
sector, the incidence of ‘organised voice’ in the form of trade union-led mobilisations in the 
2016-19 period is quite low. Strikes in this sector were generally wildcat strikes. Officials 
from the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, the main trade union body in the country, 
acknowledged that most of these strikes were ‘unorganised’ in the sense that they happened 
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in factories without union representation and were resolved without union intervention. There 
were some reports of wildcat strikes even in firms with a basic union in place. This is partly 
due to the low trade union density in Ethiopian manufacturing in general, and in industrial 
parks in particular. An ILO diagnostic study of decent work in Ethiopia found gross trade 
union density in 2010, i.e. before the establishment of the main industrial parks, was around 
to 15% and less than 1% of wage workers were covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
(ILO 2016a). According to our interviews with representatives of the main textile and 
garment trade union in 2017 and 2018 the proliferation of many small and ‘poor’ enterprises 
means that trade union density and especially collective bargaining generally remain low in 
this sector. According to trade union data more than 60% of firms in the sector did not have 
any union presence and a larger proportion of workers in the sector were not union members 
(TU03; CCOO Industria 2018). As in many other countries, larger firms are more likely to 
have a basic union.  
Among the larger firms in the sector, foreign firms were much less likely to allow trade 
unions to form than Ethiopian companies. The aforementioned ILO (2016a) report found that 
the majority of firms in the Ethiopian apparel sector had union representation, but foreign 
investors seemed resistant to union presence in their factories.8 Our own field research 
indicated that most of the foreign firms in industrial parks have no formal trade union 
presence (Figure 2). Trade unions have de facto (though not de iure) been discouraged in the 
three largest parks. Several union representatives reported that there was active 
discouragement of unions by government institutions. This is not new in Ethiopia, where 
historically the relationship between organized labour and the state has often been fractious 
(Admasie 2018). According to our interviews with trade unionists, the EIC opted for a hands-
off approach to labour matters whereas the MOLSA and BOLSAs seemed reluctant to take 
the part of workers in cases of conflict unless grievances and management misbehaviour were 
clear-cut. Different degrees of discouragement across parks partly explain different degrees 
of trade union presence.  
 
8 However, trade union representatives at Ethiopian-owned firms also consistently reported that despite the 
presence of a trade union collective bargaining agreements were not adhered to. 
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The perceived discouragement was particularly strong in the Hawassa park, where unions 
decried their lack of presence despite this being a flagship government-owned industrial park 
(TU04). In the Hawassa park the collective preference of company managers was to avoid 
formal trade union representation and instead operate with more limited, artificial, and 
undemocratic organisational forms such as workers’ councils. Such joint worker-management 
committees are common in the textile and garment sector, but tend to have a limited mandate, 
often focused on health and safety issues (ILO 2016a). Moreover, according to interviews 
with factory-level union representatives such joint committees, along with some of the basic 
union structures, were dominated by management personnel from human resources 
departments, particularly in foreign owned firms (TU06; WI02). Workers’ councils (or joint 
worker-management committees) organised by senior management without involving trade 
unions reflect a combination of two of the four dominant patterns of work practices in 
contemporary capitalism in developed countries according to the classification proposed by 
Katz (2006), i.e. a ‘low wage’ managerial archetype and the HRM model. Anti-union animus 
prevails in the former while the latter is characterised by union substitution of the kind 
observed in the Hawassa park. The brand-driven investment pattern observed in Hawassa 
might explain the tendency towards the HRM model in that park.  
The preference for union substitution over real union representation in the Hawassa park 
reflected a convergence of negative perceptions of trade unions shared by foreign investors 
and the government agencies managing the park. Managerial bargaining leverage is often 
enhanced when alternative production sites are perceived to pose a threat to the scaling up or 
even the continuation of an investment. In Ethiopia, the government seemed particularly 
sensitive to the mobility of capital in light manufacturing and eager to demonstrate that 
conflict could be managed, as shown in interviews with officials of the MOLSA. In this 
regard, the government stance vis-à-vis trade unions and workers may have contributed to a 
predominance of ‘low wage’ workplace patterns with hierarchical work relations and 
significant managerial discretion over working conditions. 
Finally, how strikes were resolved also tells us much about the shifting politics of labour 
relations in these sectors. In the initial stages, a common tactic, especially in non-unionised 
firms, was to fire organisers to prevent future mobilisation. This was clearly the approach 
followed by several Chinese firms, but also by some other foreign companies situated in 
industrial parks. The narrative was two-fold. Some managers argued that most workers would 
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not have taken action if not for the active intervention of a minority of ‘trouble-makers’, 
implying that grievances were not widespread (CM27). This is clearly not true considering 
the ample evidence of complaints over wages and working conditions. The second 
justification was that the ‘instigators’ were in fact political mobilisers using factory workers 
to further their local or political agendas (CM63). We will come back to this issue below. 
Less belligerent firms attempted to appease workers by attempting to review their own 
management procedures and communication to better respond to grievances. For example, 
some managers in Chinese firms argued that the training of staff with managerial 
responsibilities, especially of specialist workers and supervisors, was key for the better 
management of a restive labour force. They also admitted problems in communication and 
adequately transmitting the industrial corporate culture of the firm to workers (CM51; 
CM63). Better trained staff would be more able to communicate productivity imperatives and 
organise a heterogenous labour force, which included workers with different levels of 
efficiency and attention to detail. Managing such differences and troubleshooting production 
line problems was seen as critical to improving workers’ attitude to targets and avoiding 
widespread discontent.  
At the same time there is a growing divergence of attitudes towards unions on part of 
different firms. For instance, in Bole Lemi and the Eastern Industrial Zone firms were 
initially openly opposed to trade unions, as managers associated unions with more labour 
conflict. Over time, managers at a small number of the firms operating there realized that 
having adequate worker’s representation at factory level may help them manage and respond 
to labour conflicts. Similarly, the CEO of one of the largest factories in the sector reported a 
succession of different wildcat strikes and decried the difficulty in finding consistent 
interlocutors on the side of workers (CM27; CM51). Each strike came with different 
representatives. This factory eventually called in the trade union to establish a basic union, 
but spontaneous mobilisations continued to flare up, especially in connection to local 
protests. In short, despite initial animosity, some factory managers were able to shift practices 
and view unions not as a source of trouble but as part of the solution to labour grievances. 
Their changes in attitude were not directly linked to being part of a particular GPN, rather to 
the micro-level dynamics of conflict management and the variation in the incidence of such 
conflicts in a context of low union densities at national and sector level.  
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4.2 A plentiful pool of disciplined labour? Struggles over effort and mobility 
While the labour process literature has rightly devoted much attention to shop floor conflict 
and bargaining over working conditions, forms of non-organised resistance by individual 
workers may be equally if not more important than strikes in their impact on labour relations. 
Collinson and Ackroyd (2006) argue that there is a wide range of forms of resistance and 
dissent that should be considered when analysing labour relations. Apart from strikes in their 
different manifestations, sabotage, theft, work limitation such as refusing to accept overtime, 
absenteeism, and time-wasting, as well as various forms of discursive opposition to 
management speak, are also part of everyday forms of resistance at the workplace. Smith 
(2006) has stressed the importance of workers’ mobility or ‘exit’ and ‘mobility-effort 
struggles’ in shaping labour relations and suggested a second type of ‘labour indeterminacy’ 
in the work contract, manifested in individually-driven worker turnover. In the case of our 
sample of workers, the three most commonly reported forms of resistance were turnover (i.e. 
workers leaving the factory), absenteeism, and withholding of work effort, including 
reluctance to do overtime. A common complaint among foreign managers was that these 
forms of resistance were far more disruptive (and therefore effective from a workers’ point of 
view) than strikes. The various forms of resistance all affect firms’ competitiveness and even 
engender the risk of being left out of global production networks if orders are consistently 
missed for these reasons, especially in value chains where the ‘sourcing squeeze’ makes 
manufacturers particularly vulnerable.  
Although the incidence of strikes is significant, ‘exit’ is a far more widespread form of 
resistance. Exit manifested in high rates of absenteeism and turnover, the latter particularly 
for workers in their first three months into the job. According to union officials and many 
workers, high rates of absenteeism and turnover are direct responses to the low wages they 
receive. There was a shared view among managers and government officials that turnover 
rates represented a significant obstacle in the process of take-off of export-oriented light 
manufacturing in Ethiopia. It is hard to obtain consistent estimates of monthly turnover rates 
even though this was a generalized concern. One company in the Hawassa park reported that 
they faced a 6% monthly turnover compared to only a 1% annual turnover in their Chinese 
factories. According to a report from CCOO (the main trade union in Spain) in 2018, monthly 
turnover rates could be as high as 15% in many factories in other parks (CCOO Industria 
2018). We conducted a targeted longitudinal analysis of short- to medium-term employment 
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trajectories for a sample of apparel workers with an interval between surveys of 12 to 16 
months. We found that the proportion of workers no longer in the original jobs was very high 
at 41%. This includes workers who have changed to other factories in the same sector and 
those that have left the sector altogether. While all industrial parks experience similar levels 
of turnover, there is large variation at the level of the firm. This suggests that turnover is 
related to the issues workers faced in each particular factory, and not just linked to a 
particular GPN. Whether turnover persists, according to several managers, is mostly linked to 
the company’s failure to examine the causes and implement corrective measures. Our 
longitudinal evidence suggests that the primary cause of workers changing jobs was the 
search for higher wages. Another common source of frustration, according to interviews with 
workers and union representatives, was the lack of understanding of wage setting systems on 
part of workers, which led to perceptions of unfairness and bias. This was especially the case 
in newly established industrial parks like Hawassa and for workers in their first factory job. 
The complexity of performance-related pay, bonus systems, targets, quality requirements and 
other variations in take-home pay month after month left many workers disgruntled because 
their expectation of a stable wage was not met. Wages were not just low and variable, but 
also insufficient to fund the lifestyles workers expected. The promise of a salary high enough 
to save money and support their families on a regular basis seemed distant for many of new 
labour market entrants (Schaefer & Oya 2019). Moreover, turnover and absenteeism were 
compounded by difficulties in sourcing enough workers when needed, according to a report 
on HIP. The gap between factory requests for workers and candidates channelled through the 
Investors Association labour sourcing system widened between 2017 and 2018, provoking 
unexpected labour shortages for some factories (Butler 2018). Unmet expectations for some 
new workers thus contributed to the ‘exit’ (or no entry) option for poorly organised and 
inexperienced employees, who did not regard the exercise of ‘voice’ as a realistic option. In 
the words of a senior manager of a firm in the Hawassa park ‘workers’ expectations were 
unrealistic partly because of lack of previous experience, and partly because of misleading 
word of mouth suggesting salaries would be higher’ (CM34). 
However, high turnover rates were not uncommon in early stages of similar investments in 
other countries (Oya 2019). Some managers reported having faced similar rates in their 
operations in Southeast Asia-based factories, illustrating the frictions that accompany 
processes of transition to industrial work in contexts where a large proportion of the 
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workforce lacked any previous factory work experience (CM41). The most experienced 
suppliers in GPNs, with production sites in more than two countries in Asia, seemed the least 
concerned by the evidence of high turnover (CM41; CM34). The expectation, they argued, 
was that, after one or two years, worker turnover would tend to stabilise and eventually 
decline as the firm was able to retain the best workers after different rounds of hiring.9 To a 
certain extent, and as suggested by the literature on turnover in low-wage classic labour 
regimes (Smith 2006), high turnover may be a tolerable phenomenon from a managerial 
perspective if this eventually leads to a process of virtuous selection, whereby the most 
productive and reliable workers remain in the job. For some firms high turnover in 
occupations requiring basic skills may even be a strategy to reduce potential workers’ 
resistance and collective action. This may explain why many globally integrated firms in 
Ethiopia confronted this problem without making significant concession to workers (Hardy 
and Hauge 2019). 
4.3 Local political conflicts and their impact on labour relations 
It is tempting, and in fact common in the literature, to read all instances of labour conflict as 
evidence of class conflict between capital and labour. However, in Ethiopia the interpretation 
of drivers of labour conflict is complicated by the fact that the acceleration of strikes and 
mobilisation around labour grievances coincided with a tumultuous period of political 
tensions and protests, that began in 2014 and escalated in 2016 (see Fisher & Gebrewahd 
2019 for an overview). We must stress that our own research, along with various other 
studies and media reporting, finds a host of genuine labour grievances and in many instances 
these are clear drivers of conflict. However, it is difficult to disentangle the role played by 
opposition politics in some areas of the Oromia and SNNP regions of Ethiopia, where three 
of the sampled industrial parks are located. These areas saw widespread protests against the 
federal government aiming greater political rights and the recognition for regional and sub-
regional identities. Company managers in those parks reported that their local informants 
linked several wildcat strikes to local opposition groups pushing workers to strike as part of 
 
9 Anecdotal evidence from recent conversations with few factory managers in Hawassa suggest that by 2020 the 
turnover problem was significantly less acute than in the early stages of operation. 
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the political mobilisation against the federal government (CM51). The claim was that while 
grievances had usually been resolved on an individual basis or with small groups of workers, 
once political protests erupted, factories witnessed an escalation of strikes in terms of 
frequency and intensity (CM50). Some managers suggested that high-profile factories and 
industrial parks were seen as strategic targets to boost the visibility of regional and local 
opposition groups. In fact, some of the strikes in 2018-19 spared medium-sized factories and 
instead focused on the largest factories inside the park, especially in the Eastern Industrial 
Park (CM51). This targeting appears to indicate the influence of local and regional political 
protests on labour conflict. 
Many companies failed to anticipate these political developments. Ethiopia had been 
perceived, perhaps naively, as a haven of comparative political stability (at least in the central 
regions of the country). Suddenly, foreign capitalists found themselves in a political climate 
at odds with their image of a strong state friendly to overseas investors. During that time, a 
stark contrast emerged between the views of some company managers, who claimed that state 
institutions, especially at local level, usually took the side of workers, and the perceptions of 
trade unionists, who often reported an alliance between the central state and foreign investors, 
especially those situated in industrial parks. Indeed, in some instances of strikes and local 
protests spilling into industrial parks, federal police were deployed to protect factories 
(CM25; CM50). These divergent perceptions reflect the complexity of centre-periphery 
relations within the Ethiopian state (Clapham 2018, Markakis 2013), i.e. how local-level 
actions may not be aligned with broad directives from the federal institutions, particularly in 
more conflictual areas such as Oromia. For example, the regional Oromia labour bureaus had 
become much less investor-friendly, according to several foreign company senior managers. 
This change in attitude was reflected in greater support for workers’ grievances, and fewer 
(or slower) interventions in wildcat strikes and other protests directly affecting the premises 
of factories. Many factory managers, especially in Chinese firms, also complained about the 
‘bias’ in local courts, which apparently routinely ruled in favour of workers.10 
 
10 They however also complained about the rigidity of the labour law, implicitly acknowledging that courts were 
simply applying the law. 
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Several foreign investors seemed confused as to whether the state was ‘on their side’ or not 
during the more tumultuous months. An important implication is that employers, especially 
newly arrived foreign investors, are not generally sufficiently tuned into the complexities of 
national and local political dynamics. Understanding and anticipating these developments and 
the possible effects on their operations might have helped reduce labour conflict. The troubles 
facing many of the most affected foreign firms reflect missing organizational capabilities, in 
the sense of contextual knowledge and the relationships needed to organise collective 
activities (a production line, managing supplies, transition to export logistics, etc.) in 
particular social and political contexts they are not so familiar with (Khan 2019).  
5 Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the dynamics of industrial labour relations during the process of 
setting up new manufacturing locations serving global production networks in a low-income 
country setting, using the example of the Ethiopian apparel sector. The worldwide 
restructuring of production networks by lead firms in the sector and a proactive space-based 
industrial policy programme in Ethiopia have combined to entice suppliers of leading apparel 
GPNs to set up factories in a series of new industrial parks in the country. Both investors and 
the Ethiopian government expected to find a large and pliant labour force willing to work for 
low wages. However, the new sector has already seen a wave of collective and individual 
resistance from workers, driven in part by grievances over wages and non-wage working 
conditions. We have argued that the best way to understand how certain forms of labour 
agency are produced, and the impacts they have on workers and firms, is via a nested multi-
scalar analytical framework, drawing on insights into global capital mobility, production 
networks and labour processes, to illustrate developments at the level of the country, the 
sector and the firm. We proceeded by disaggregating the key actors - the state, capital and 
labour – to show how different parts of government, varieties of capital, and segments of the 
workforce are affected and respond to GPN pressures and opportunities differently. National 
government frequently play a contradictory role in regulating labour markets and working 
conditions as they seek to maintain inflows of FDI while not excessively undermining their 
own political legitimacy (Smith et al. 2018). Firms, in turn, differ in their target markets, 
business experience in different contexts, and conditions of integration into global production 
networks. We use these differentiated sets of actors to provide an analysis of the local politics 
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of production based on a mixture of large-scale quantitative and in-depth qualitative 
evidence. 
Our analysis uncovered widespread ‘unofficial’ resistance to low wages and strenuous 
working conditions on part of workers. This activism comprises a variety of forms, from 
large-scale collective action in form of wildcat strikes to individual struggles over work effort 
and mobility, resulting in absenteeism and high turnover. Industrial parks emerged as spaces 
of particularly intense contestation. Many conflicts result from the collision of productivity 
imperatives on part of manufacturing firms tied into demanding, but low value-added, 
segments of global production networks with the expectations of workers with limited or no 
prior experience in industry, who assumed international firms would pay better. Conflicts 
were sharpened by the suppression of trade union activity in many, but not all, industrial 
parks and firms, which drove workers to organise outside of union structures and hampered 
industrial dialogue. The prevailing opinion among government officials and foreign 
managers, that democratically organised union structures could be substituted for by less 
democratic organisation forms with more limited mandates such as workers’ councils, is no 
longer shared by all firms and some have allowed the formation of union branches in their 
premises. Individual resistance by workers unused to the intense discipline and submission to 
the demands of the production processes demanded of factory workers frequently took the 
form of exit. Disgruntled workers would leave the sector altogether, while others would seek 
to move employer in search of better wages and working conditions. The government 
reacted, in concert with bi- and multilateral donors, by putting in place programmes to help 
recruitment by assisting with the sourcing and screening and workers. However, in some 
cases even the labour sourcing was insufficient, resulting in challenges for some newly 
establish factories to meet their increasing labour requirements. 
Crucially, our approach has highlighted the importance of taking into account local political 
conflicts when analysing instances and drivers of labour resistance. In Ethiopia, industrial 
strive resulted from a complex interplay of the factory-based grievances we just discussed 
and political mobilisation against the national government which coalesced into demands for 
greater representation of some ethnic groups in the national and sub-national governments. 
Local political actors sought to capitalise on existing grievances by workers by targeting 
prominent foreign factories; a political strategy made feasible by the close identification of 
the national government with FDI-driven industrialisation and the construction of the new 
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industrial parks. The result are fleeting, unstable, and highly localised politics of production 
that are structured, but not determined, by the dynamics of global production networks and 
the strategic aims of national political actors. 
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